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Abstract 
This teaching case explores the political, socio-technical, and business-related challenges 
of the introduction of a state-recognized electronic identity (e-ID) in Switzerland. Based 
on real-life events, the case puts every student in the shoes of a board member of 
SwissSign Group, a joint venture between 20 of the most influential public and private 
companies in Switzerland. This conglomerate faces three major challenges. To solve these 
challenges they need, among others, to learn from the past failures of SuisseID, the 
previous unsuccessful attempt to launch a nationwide e-ID infrastructure. Students must 
also analyze current political and regulatory events that impact on the e-credential 
market and need to develop a business model for the new solution, SwissID. This teaching 
case is designed for students from the undergraduate level upward. The content may be 
suitable for courses or modules relating to e-government, the platform economy, business 
models, value co-creation, information ethics, digitalization, PPPs, information security, 
and privacy. 
Keywords: Teaching case, case study, electronic identity, e-ID, digital government transformation 
Introduction 
Have you been a victim of identity theft? If yes, you are one of several million people a year. Criminals use 
someone else’s personal information to take over existing or to create new bank accounts, make fraudulent 
online purchases, get mobile phone numbers, or obtain loans or certain government benefits. The numbers 
are growing significantly year on year, and are starting to take on worrisome proportions. So, what can do 
about this? Renouncing the Internet and the commodities of modern life is not an option for many if not 
most of us. The solution to all our current problems is – supposedly2 – a technological one: electronic 
identification (e-ID). This is currently seen as a prerequisite for the secure identification, authentication, 
and digital signing via the Internet (Whitley et al. 2014). Put simply, identification is the process of showing, 
referencing, or letting know who someone (or something) is. Authentication is the act of proving a claimed 
identity. A digital signature replaces a handwritten signature. It is used to determine the identity of the 
signatory of a document in a secure and traceable way. An e-ID brings together all these functions and 
becomes a key enabler of more trustworthy and more secure private and public digital services (Lentner 
and Parycek 2016; Melin et al. 2016; Seltsikas and O'keefe 2010).  
                                                             
1 To obtain the Teaching Notes, kindly  contact Tobias Mettler.  
2  For an interesting article on the black market of fake e-IDs, see Spagnoletti et al. (2019). 
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In the physical world, identification documents such as passports or (physical) identity cards are ways to 
provide information on one’s identity. In the digital world, by contrast, this function is fulfilled by an 
electronic identity. Creating such an unforgeable identity is a problem that is as old as computers are.3 It is 
frequently reduced to developing systems in a way that they can respond to the following three questions 
(Fiat and Shamir 1987): First, Who am I? This question relates to what experts understand as identification. 
The goal is to recognize an individual by distinguishing him from other persons. Second, Am I who I claim 
to be? This question is associated with what experts call authentication. Here, the goal is to verify a person’s 
identity by processing certain data that refer to the person who asks, for instance, something a person knows 
(e.g. a password, a pin number), owns (e.g. an ID card, a mobile phone), inherits (e.g. a fingerprint, face 
recognition). The third question is Can you trust me? This question relates to the concept of digital 
signatures, which have the goal of creating a certification of the integrity of the person who asks. Encrypting 
and digitally signing a document provides a strong indication of a person’s authenticity and can also be used 
to detect tampering or forgery of a document during the transmission of a document.  
In practice, the implementation of e-ID in different countries takes various forms (see Exhibit 1), and may 
or may not include all the discussed technological features. Besides these technological differences, there 
are also different approaches to governance and scaling (see Exhibit 2), as we will now describe.  
National e-ID infrastructures in certain countries in Europe 
Who has driven the introduction of e-IDs in different countries? Given the interactions between for instance 
social security benefits, tax returns, casting of votes, many countries’ governments have taken leading roles 
in the introduction of a working e-ID infrastructure (Kubicek and Noack 2010).  
A pioneer in and an example of a publicly driven digital identity is Estonia. After gaining independence 
from the Soviet Union, Estonia already introduced an e-ID in the form of a physical card in 2002 (Martens 
2010). Having a digital identity is mandatory for every Estonian citizen, irrespective of their geographical 
location and their willingness to use the card. Estonia now has one of the most sophisticated card-based e-
ID infrastructures in the world; all necessary personal information is stored on a chip. Multiple options 
exist, such as the classic identity card, the Mobile ID, or the smart ID. The card also provides Estonian 
citizens with a digital signature. Thus, Estonia’s e-ID is not only used as a traditional travel document but 
also for various other purposes, such as for storing health insurance information, for logging into bank 
accounts, for e-voting, or as a way to access personal health records (e-Estonia Briefing Centre 2019). 
Belgium is another example of a government that has chosen to keep its e-ID infrastructure under its own 
control. Belgium issued e-ID cards in 2004. There are three types of identity documents: regular electronic 
ID cards for citizens over 12, kids’ ID for nationals under 12, and electronic foreigner cards for both EU and 
non-EU citizens living in Belgium. Since 2009, all citizens over 15 must carry such a card on their person. 
Like in Estonia, Belgium’s e-ID card is basically a regular ID card with a chip that allows one to perform 
certain electronic transactions, such as proving one’s identity to authorities, signing electronic documents, 
or securely logging into public digital services. A PIN code gives one access to the secret key on the card 
(National Register (Belpic) 2019). 
Denmark is another example of a publicly driven approach to the introduction of a national e-ID 
infrastructure. Different to Estonia and Belgium, however, Denmark’s government decided to publicly open 
the process to tender, after an early unsuccessful approach to develop an own solution. Its national e-ID 
infrastructure, NemID, was launched by a private provider in close cooperation with Denmark’s banks in 
2010. For Danes, the ID system is free of charge. NemID is a PIN-protected card. Different to Estonia’s e-
ID, NemID can be used by citizens aged 15 and above, as well as by organizations for public and private 
services. Its main objective is to offer the simple, secure, and efficient identification of private and public 
entities as well as to provide a digital signature for documents, particularly for mobile payments 
(Observatory of Public Sector Innovation 2019). 
Sweden’s government decided to leave the realization of its e-ID to private sector vendors. Since 1999, 
mainly banks and large telecommunication providers have offered different e-ID solutions. The first 
BankID was issued in 2003. The BankID network now includes 11 banks, which makes it one of the most 
                                                             
3  In fact, the problem is even older; historians found evidence that this was already an issue in ancient Greece.  
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widely used digital services. BankID is available on several media, including smart cards, soft certificates, 
and mobile phones. Compliance with the national regulations is monitored by the newly established state 
agency Verva, which currently is driving major standardization reforms and is creating a more federated 
approach to personal identification.  
In 2000, Germany’s government launched a nationwide digitalization initiative that should largely 
modernize its existing e-government infrastructure. However, this initiative has not yet included a plan to 
introduce a nationwide e-ID; its major objective was to extend, by the end of 2006, the online presence of 
public administrations and the availability of public digital services. Not until 2010 was a machine-readable 
ID card introduced on which all personal information (printed on the card) – and, if desired – fingerprints 
are stored digitally (German Federal Office for Information Security 2019). In everyday use, the e-ID card 
can be used for both the authentication and signing of documents. The provision of the infrastructure, 
hardware, software, and the guarantee of operations was outsourced to the private sector. Owing the low 
number of public and private services that require e-ID as prerequisite for identification and authentication, 
adoption of the card has been slow. 
As a citizen, you likely access digital services not only from your own home country. Yet, the e-ID 
infrastructures we have presented above have a strong national focus. To extend the use of locally or 
nationally issued e-IDs, there is a strong need for an international perspective (see box below).  
The European Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market (eIDAS) 
With the goal to establish a digital single market in Europe, on July 2014, the European Parliament issued 
regulation N°910/2014, which pledges all countries in the European Union (EU) to extend their national e-
ID infrastructure so that electronic signatures, electronic seals, time stamps, electronic delivery services, 
and website authentications work across borders. Electronic identities issued by other countries should 
receive the same legal status as traditional paper-based documents. This was a milestone to provide a 
predictable regulatory environment to enable secure and seamless electronic interactions between 
businesses, citizens, and public authorities (European Commission 2019). 
 
The history of the e-ID in Switzerland 
“Good things come to those who wait.” This expression, used in German-speaking countries, probably best 
describes the e-ID journey in Switzerland. Known for its low risk propensity, Switzerland’s government 
extensively observed developments in neighboring countries before launching its own e-ID initiatives. 
Although the necessary legal framework concerning the use of digital signatures was already in place in 
Switzerland by 2005, it was not until 2010 that an e-ID solution was available in the country. 
Initial steps and early failure 
Swiss Postal Service introduced, in collaboration with the private company QuoVadis Trustlink, the 
SuisseID, an e-ID solution either based on a USB stick or a chip card. SuisseID had a good starting position. 
Promoted by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and financially supported by Switzerland’s 
government with 4 million Swiss Francs (CHF), it was designed to provide a digital signature and an 
electronic identity to citizens and businesses. While authentication features were mostly requested by 
online service providers (owing to an increase in online shopping fraud), digital signatures were also 
demanded by citizens. However, at the time, only the authentication function was offered in the market. To 
cover the development and maintenance costs, the initial pricing for SuisseID varied for private and 
business customers, and was between 104 and 363 CHF. The aim was to sell more than 300,000 IDs by the 
end of 2010. To achieve this goal, Switzerland’s government strongly promoted the purchase of SuisseID 
and granted subsidies to Swiss Postal Service for the ramp-up. But SuisseID did not meet the envisioned 
target. Although Swiss Postal Service was able to win more online solution providers to invest in SuisseID 
so as to make the service more attractive, interest from private and business customers was low and mainly 
related to only one usage case: change of residence. Thus, SuisseID never reached a critical mass and 
subsequently failed.  
 Challenges in Switzerland’s e-credential market 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 4 
Becoming a competitive market 
Several reasons led to this failure: For one thing, private customers were not prepared to pay for a SuisseID. 
Although the initial purchase of SuisseID was subsidized by Switzerland’s government, it was fairly 
expensive to renew, and prices began to rise owing to the absence of a large user base. This led to an exodus 
of many existing customers. Finally, the solution was simply impracticable. While token-based 
authentication (with USB sticks or chip cards) were common in the early years of e-banking and e-
commerce, in 2013, new competitors such as the biggest telco provider in Switzerland, Swisscom, rushed 
into the market and offered more convenient solutions, which used only a customer’s mobile phone SIM 
card. Each new SIM card is delivered with the possibility to authenticate. Most importantly, Swisscom’s 
Mobile ID is free to private customers and incurs modest monthly costs for business customers. Another 
free solution was offered by Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) from August 2015. SwissPass, an RFID chip that 
stores the personal information (e.g. the name, birth date, gender, and photographs) of rail commuters, 
rapidly became a serious competitor to the two other solutions in the market, owing to the sheer popularity 
of public transport in Switzerland. Despite criticism from some concerned parties that it allows the SBB to 
trace citizens’ movements, in 2018, around 3.8 million people in Switzerland (44.5% of the population) had 
a SwissPass (see Exhibit 3). 
To increase market penetration, Swiss Postal Service and Swiss Federal Railways started a joint venture in 
May 2017 with the objective to merge solutions and offer a true, nationwide e-ID infrastructure called 
SwissID. To further extend market power, SwissSign Group was founded in March 2018 – a conglomerate 
of 19 private and public organizations, including large firms such as Credit Suisse, Raiffeisen, UBS, Axa, 
Baloise, Helvetia, Swiss Life, and Zurich Insurance Group. Different to SuisseID, SwissID is based on a new 
business model and is free to citizens. By the end November 2018, more than half a million SwissIDs had 
already been issued. Numbers will significantly grow when SwissPass and other existing e-ID solutions from 
member organizations (e.g. banking or insurance ID solutions) will be merged with SwissID in the near 
future (see Exhibit 4). 
A detailed account of events around the introduction of the e-ID in Switzerland 
In December 2003, Switzerland’s Parliament approved the federal law on digital signatures. 
In January 2005, the federal law and related legal ordinances on the use of digital signatures were enacted. 
In May 2010, Swiss Postal Service introduced, in collaboration with the private company QuoVadis 
Trustlink, SuisseID, an e-ID solution based on either a USB stick or a chip card. To cover development and 
maintenance costs, interested users are charged a price between 104 and 363 CHF (including 25 CHF for 
initial verification), depending on the validity period (max. 3 years). Owing to its high costs, the adoption 
of SuisseID remained low. 
In October 2013, the largest telco provider in Switzerland, Swisscom, launched Mobile ID. Different to 
SuisseID, it does not rely on an additional token, since it uses the mobile phone’s SIM card. It is free to 
private customers (the use of Mobile ID may incur some fees). Business customers pay a monthly fee 
depending on the number of e-IDs issued and on usage. 
In May 2015, the Federal Office of Police opened an informal consultation, Concept for Swiss state-
recognized e-ID systems. Switzerland’s government decided against a public e-ID infrastructure and 
restricted its role to defining the legal framework and providing verification of a citizen’s identity.  
In August 2015, Swiss Federal Railways introduced SwissPass, an RFID chip that stores personal 
information (e.g. name, birth date, gender, and the photo) free to people with a specific commuter ticket. 
Owing to the sheer popularity of public transport in Switzerland, it quickly became a serious competitor to 
SuisseID and Mobile ID. 
In February 2017, Switzerland’s government opened consultation in Parliament for the formulation of a 
Federal Act on Recognized Electronic Identification Units. The Federal Department of Justice and Police 
(FDJP) is authorized to prepare a draft version of the law later in 2019. 
In May 2017, Swiss Postal Service and Swiss Federal Railways started a joint venture, launching a new, 
immaterial e-ID called SwissID. SuisseID was discontinued. Owing to both public organizations’ 
monopolistic role, this new e-ID solution began to take off. 
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In September 2017, all major telco providers in Switzerland (i.e. Salt, Sunrise, and Swisscom) support 
Mobile ID in order to increase its market share and to counter the increasing popularity of SwissID. 
In March 2018, Swiss Postal Service and Swiss Federal Railways decided to extend SwissID’s reach. A 
conglomerate of 17 private and public organizations (including Credit Suisse, Raiffeisen, UBS, Axa, Baloise, 
Helvetia, Swiss Life, and Zurich Insurance Group) founded SwissSign Group AG with the objective to 
making SwissID the de facto standard for electronic authentication and identification in Switzerland. The 
market power of this new public-private partnership (PPP) is enormous, since it comprises banks, 
insurance firms, health insurance firms, telcos, and public services.  
In March 2019, Switzerland’s Parliament votes in favor for the Federal Act on Recognized Electronic 
Identification Units, with some minor modifications. A publicly owned e-ID infrastructure became a distant 
prospect. This decision gave SwissID the opportunity to dominate the Swiss e-ID market in the future.  
 
 
The vision of the future 
Can we talk about a truly interoperable, verified, national e-ID infrastructure in Switzerland? As yet, the 
personal credentials of citizens applying for one of the existing e-ID solutions (e.g. SuisseID, Mobile ID, 
SwissPass, SwissID) have not been verified by the state. Verification has typically been done indirectly, i.e. 
a person must submit a copy of an official document as a part of the application process to obtain an e-ID. 
To develop the necessary legal framework so that issued e-IDs become state-recognized, the Federal Office 
of Police opened an informal consultation on what will be known as the e-ID act (Swiss Federal Office of 
Justice 2019). This new law foresees a slightly different role for the state compared to the other countries 
we have discussed. In Switzerland, the state does not act directly as an issuer of the e-ID. Citizens can obtain 
one through the different e-ID providers without contact with the state (see Figure 1). However, the state 
provides the relevant and verified information to the e-ID providers that is necessary for e-ID providers to 
properly authenticate a citizen. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Issuance of an e-ID in Switzerland (based on Swiss Federal Office of Justice) 
The state is also not in direct contact with online service providers (see Figure 2) and is not actively involved 
in the development of the e-ID market. Instead, the state’s role is limited to defining the required legal 
framework, to accredit and control the entry of new e-ID providers, and to oversee the e-ID providers’ 
operations. The latter is subject to a controversial discussion, since it remains unclear how the state can 
effectively monitor e-ID providers; further, since the state holds equity in all the big players in the e-ID 
market, some critics fear that it will not be wholly neutral. Another point of discussion is the certification 
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of e-ID provers. This certification will be optional, but there is hope that this will become an official seal of 
quality. It is only after receiving certification that e-ID providers become official, state-recognized issuers 
of e-IDs. In March 2019, Switzerland’s Parliament greenlighted the enactment of the e-ID act. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Using the e-ID for online transactions (based on Swiss Federal Office of Justice) 
However, as is clear from the previous figures, the state is not the only actor in this e-credential market. 
More importantly, it is crucial to also focus on the interplays between the e-ID providers, online services 
providers, and citizens. By understanding this, one may better understand the potentials and perils of the 
state’s decision to not actively seek to develop a publicly funded, national e-ID infrastructure (see the box 
below). 
 
Actors and their roles in Switzerland’s future e-ID market 
State: The prevailing opinion in Switzerland is that the dynamic e-ID market is not compatible with the 
state’s fairly rigid architecture. The state is not considered a suitable developer and issuer of the e-ID. 
Rather, this should be done by private companies. The state must define the rules for the cooperation of all 
the parties involved in the market, monitor compliance, and sanction misconduct. Thus, the state provides 
the legal and standardized framework that lays the foundation for trust. Another state function is 
certification, which is centrally administered by the State Identity Service (SID). Service providers who wish 
to offer a state-recognized e-ID must first obtain a permit from the state. Once they are recognized as e-ID 
service providers, the state sends the necessary personal identification data to these service providers. 
e-ID providers: The e-ID providers are the issuers of the e-ID. They develop and maintain the technical 
infrastructure required for the authentication and identification of citizens, ensure the infrastructure’s 
security and operational reliability, and assign and manage personal requests for e-IDs. To be recognized 
by the state, they must be certified. Although it is voluntary, certification is regarded as a state seal of quality. 
To activate the e-ID, a citizen first sends their identification data (e.g. social security number and other 
personal credentials) to the e-ID provider. The e-ID provider forwards them to the SID for verification. The 
SID then requests permission from the citizen, via the e-ID provider’s communication channel, to forward 
these personal credentials to the e-ID provider. If the citizen allows this, the SID forwards these credentials 
to the e-ID provider, which activates an e-ID account. Through this process, a citizen can receive an e-ID 
without any direct contact with the state. 
Online service providers: These may be private companies or government agencies that offer digital 
services that require reliable proof of a citizen’s identity (e.g. the passport office, e-banking, secure postal 
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services, electronic medical records). Online service providers only register an e-ID if they have a user 
agreement with an official e-ID provider. If there is an agreement between the e-ID provider and online 
service provider, citizens with an activated e-ID can authenticate themselves in the corresponding digital 
service. Only if the citizen’s given identity turns out to be correct will an online service provider complete 
the registration.  
Citizens: Citizens can apply for an e-ID of their choice. There are only two touchpoints with other actors, 
mainly with the online service providers from which they request a digital service and with the e-ID provider 
for the initial registration and the definition of access rights regarding which online service providers are 
allowed to access what type of personal information. 
 
 
Challenge 1: How does one deal with the ongoing political debate? 
As a SwissSign Group management board member, you are in the driving seat and must overcome a 
number of problems. The retirement and the passive role Switzerland’s government adopted have fueled 
an ongoing public debate, which cannot be swept under the carpet and which has strongly influenced 
citizens’ perceptions of e-IDs generally and specifically SwissID. There is much insecurity among citizens. 
Many arguments in favor or against the government’s decision are discussed in the media. While the 
number of e-ID accounts is growing, the ambiguity in the public debate may jeopardize active use of 
SwissID.  
What proponents of the future e-credential market are saying 
Based on the experiences of other European countries, Switzerland’s corporate union, Economiesuisse, 
argues that a fully publicly funded implementation of a national e-ID infrastructure would lead to a massive 
explosion of public costs. According to it, a PPP is more cost-efficient and can more flexibly respond to 
citizens’ needs. Some members of larger Swiss banks argue that strong state involvement fosters a 
monopoly that may hamper the emergence of private and possibly more innovative e-ID providers, limiting 
“a real choice.” The Swiss Trade Association claims that the strength of the outlined e-credential market, 
compared to a fully public solution, is that it prevents the state from monitoring citizens. In the same vein, 
most Swiss cantons have promoted the notion that an open market for e-ID providers will lead to more 
innovative, more flexible solutions, and faster and better adaptation to technological and social changes in 
the population (the survival of the fittest hypothesis). Overall, it is assumed that market competition will 
generate several user-friendly solutions from different providers, allowing users to choose the solution they 
trust most. As Swiss FinTech Innovations’ members highlight, it is also important to recognize that several 
private companies have long been working on e-ID solutions. Shifting to a purely governmental solution 
now would render the resources these companies have invested worthless overnight, “leaving these firms 
out in the cold.” According to them, one must build on already existing efforts. Further, a major assertion 
is that the majority of (private) online service providers prefer to collaborate with other private entities 
rather than a government agency. This is important if one is to rapidly and efficiently develop an attractive 
e-credential market in Switzerland with many online services that require e-ID as a prerequisite. Given that 
many of the private firms involved in e-ID likely already have established relationships, the emergence of 
network effects will be achieved much easier and quicker. Finally, the Association of Swiss Cantonal Banks 
argues that a business-friendly solution will promote Switzerland’s competitiveness and innovative strength 
as a business location, which should be a goal of Switzerland’s government, since this is a key strategic 
objective in the new strategy Digital Switzerland devised by the Federal Council.  
What opponents of the future e-credential market are saying 
Opponents of the direction Switzerland’s state has taken have also diffused their arguments in the media. 
The Pirate Party for instance has expressed strong concerns that private companies will have an incentive 
to use the data generated during the creation and use of the e-ID for commercial purposes. Although there 
are legal limits to not exploit the transactional data hosted on private servers, recent cases have shown that 
private firms don’t always respect data protection regulations. Pointing to Sweden’s e-ID case, certain 
cantons have reservations regarding the future interoperability of the different e-ID solutions. In their view, 
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new e-ID providers have sprung up like mushrooms since Switzerland’s government established a legal 
framework. Thus, it will become more difficult in the future, notwithstanding a major consolidation of 
players in the market. Certain political parties see the e-ID as a first-order government matter: only the 
state can really assure a secure and trustworthy e-ID infrastructure. Only by continually testing the security 
and compliance of the e-ID infrastructure can the state certify and guarantee e-ID providers’ quality. But 
how exactly should this be done? Will the private firms really provide access to all crucial information? 
Accordingly, opponents such as the Swiss Data Alliance, Swico, and others consider the verification and 
granting of identity to be the sole responsibility of the state. All parties involved rely on the established 
identity verification processes of the state. Only the state can offer this trust and reliability; thus, this should 
not be marketized and left to the whims of market competitors. Further, certain political parties highlight 
that the credibility of Swiss identity documents is specifically based on the fact that they were issued by the 
state and not by private companies: “Nobody wants a for-profit firm, such as the SwissSign Group, to have 
access to very personal medical files, tax returns, and other highly sensitive information just because they 
issued an e-ID.” SwissSign Group needs to devise a communication strategy to counter this and possibly 
other criticism. 
Challenge 2: How does one overcome techno-skepticism? 
The ongoing political debate about Switzerland’s government’s role holds danger for SwissID’s future 
success. As we know from the lamentable fate of SuisseID, technological and economic4 aspects also 
critically determine e-ID adoption and diffusion (Wihlborg 2013).  
What proponents of SwissID are saying 
There are some good reasons for an e-ID. More and more transactions (e.g. electronic payments, online 
shopping) are done digitally. Once citizens go online, they leave a digital footprint. But most citizens want 
to retain sovereignty over their data. They do not want to disclose vast amounts of data in every online 
business transaction, which then can be further used and commercialized. Also, the more you distribute 
your personal information among different platforms, the higher the risk of falling victim to identity theft. 
As the proponents of e-ID argue, an e-ID can give citizens back control over their own data. Data security 
is ensured as follows: The e-ID system can be set up double-blind. This allows e-ID users to disclose only 
minimum information (e.g. about their insurance cover) as confirmation to other trusted third parties. To 
do this, an insurance company must be part of the e-ID market (i.e. be a reliable party). If the e-ID holder 
authenticates themselves on a portal of another reliable party, which needs to know whether a person has 
an insurance policy, this information can be queried directly via the e-ID. The trusted third party only 
receives information that the insurance policy exists, but no other sensitive information. Conversely, the 
insurance company also receives no details about the third party to whom the information was sent. Thus, 
the e-ID system functions as a kind of data broker, which increases citizens’ privacy – both security and 
comfort increase with the use of e-ID. Users can use their e-ID as their only login. It is cumbersome to have 
and memorize many passwords and user names. Further, login procedures are both a nuisance and time-
consuming. In the case of SwissID, a holder of an active e-ID simply needs to click on the PROCEED icon 
on a reliable party’s website.  
                                                             
4  The economic dimension is addressed by the subsequent challenge.  
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Figure 3.  User interactions with SwissID 
 
A digital identity can increase security, trust, and comfort for citizens and for online service providers. 
Without an approved e-ID, it is hard, costly, and time-consuming for an online service provider to 
effectively establish whether or not someone is who they claim to be. This is a fundamental function of an 
e-ID. All information in an e-ID is confirmed and verified and is therefore reliable and trustworthy. This 
allows processes to be carried out online, which previously required high or very high trust in the identity 
authentication (e.g. tax returns, conclusion of contracts, inspection of pension funds, car rentals, etc.). No 
time-consuming research and confirmation process is required. This could have considerable cost savings, 
can increase the conversion rate, and can reduce fraudulent behavior in online shopping, since online 
service providers may fear misleading accounts or fake addresses less. For proponents of e-IDs, this clearly 
responds to the need for more secure business transactions owing to the increase in identity theft on digital 
channels. 
What opponents of SwissID are saying 
In contrast to the previous arguments, there are many reasons against the national introduction of an e-ID 
infrastructure in Switzerland. First, having an e-ID is not an absolute necessity. As a SECO-commissioned 
study showed, there is low public interest in digital signatures and authentication via an e-ID (Hirter et al. 
2016).5 People seem to not have a real pain point, especially because Switzerland’s system has strongly 
fostered trust between citizens and the state. But what if it becomes mandatory to use an e-ID to access 
certain government services? The so-called transparent citizen scenario is one that almost all political 
parties in Switzerland seek to avoid. Thus, the introduction of e-ID could also be seen as risk for 
government-citizen relationships. 
Opponents of the current constellation also argue that SwissSign Group’s dominant role could pose a risk 
to citizens’ privacy. Representing all major banks, insurance firms, and public organizations, there is a 
certain suspicion that the transactions in this system may be exploited by one or several of the involved 
parties. As many national and international data scandals have shown, there is a very high incentive (and 
criminal intent) to somehow further commercialize the data. Because Switzerland’s government’s 
governance and control mechanisms are still very vague, many citizens prefer to not actively use their e-ID. 
Security experts also point to a single point of failure risk. Since much personal information is stored on e-
ID providers’ premises, they could become targets for hackers. In this perspective, a distributed solution 
such as that currently used by users (different logins for different digital services) makes it harder for 
hackers to access sensitive information.  
                                                             
5  Note that having an e-ID account, provided to one by default (e.g. SwissPass if you are a train commuter) is not the 
same as actively using the e-ID for online transactions. We still know very little about the de facto uses of e-IDs.  
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Finally, if we look at SwissID’s positioning, we see even more problems. There are other solutions on the 
market that are almost instantly available. If you have a mobile phone with a Swiss telco company, you get 
a Mobile ID. If you have a commuter ticket, you get a SwissPass. However, there is a need to create active 
demand for SwissID. Further, the benefits to online service providers (e.g. the Swiss online shop Digitec) 
are limited; in fact, it could even be unattractive to them, because they may lose valuable customer-specific 
information, which they currently collect. SwissID is based on the standard of minimal information, i.e. 
when customers order online from these companies, SwissID confirms only that they are of legal age, not 
how old they are. This stands in contrast to the logic of many of these companies, which use sophisticated 
data collection and repurposing strategies, to their advantage. Thus, SwissSign Group must identify ways 
to become more attractive. 
Challenge 3: How does one overcome the chicken-and-egg problem? 
Switzerland’s e-ID market is a good example of a multisided platform that features two (or more) distinct 
groups of actors who depend on one another. The platform owner (in our case, SwissSign Group) needs to 
create value in the e-ID market by matchmaking (or building) a user base and by minimizing transaction 
costs between two or more distinct affiliated actors (in this case, citizens and online service providers). For 
such an e-ID market to become sustainable, there is a need for a long-term strategic plan in order to balance 
the involved parties’ distinct demands (Vimarlund and Mettler 2017). A market very seldomly emerges 
spontaneously owing to a shared interest or demand. 
However, what interests are more important or should be addressed first, given the limited available 
resources? Should SwissSign Group intensify its marketing to get more citizens to use SwissID, or is it more 
important to build a considerable network of online service providers that base their services on SwissID? 
This problem, commonly referred to as the chicken-and-egg problem, is a massive task for all e-ID 
providers. On the one hand, online service providers don’t want to invest in a platform with a weak customer 
base. On the other hand, citizens are more likely to use SwissID if a large number of leading online service 
providers use it in their registration process. There is a vicious circle here: the more people have a SwissID 
account, the more online service providers are likely to integrate it into their digital services; the fewer 
online service providers are willing to accept an e-ID as a login, the fewer individuals will request an e-ID. 
SwissSign Group’s managers firmly believe that an ecosystem approach is the best way out of this negative 
spiral. Their solution is to roll out SwissID to all the shareholder companies in the joint venture. The fact 
that the conglomerate contains most of Switzerland’s biggest companies will make SwissID attractive to 
citizens from the outset. A first milestone was replacing the old registration procedure of Swiss Postal 
Service with SwissID. Suddenly, SwissID had several thousand active users, making it more attractive for 
other online service providers. UBS and SBB are expected to follow. Will this be enough for SwissSign Group 
to kickstart SwissID and to create lock-in effects?  
Tasks for Students 
Given the ongoing heated political debate, techno-skepticism, and the challenging chicken-and-egg 
problem, it is hard to successfully implement e-IDs in Switzerland. It is your job to take over. As a SwissSign 
Group management board member, what will you do to overcome these challenges in Switzerland’s e-
credential market? 
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Exhibit 1: The technical implementation of e-ID 
 
Figure 3.  The range of technical solutions for implementing e-ID 
 
Exhibit 2: A comparison of nationwide Swiss e-ID infrastructures  
 
Figure 4.  Current state and possible future development of governance and scaling of nation-wide e-ID 
infrastructures of selected countries (the shaded flag = the future tendency) 
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Exhibit 3: Overview of market shares of Swiss e-ID solutions  
Table 1. Market shares of Swiss e-ID solutions 
Name e-ID type Issuing 
organization 
Ownership Launch date Approximate 
number of 
clients in 2018 
(self-reported) 
Suisse ID Based on USB 
stick or chip 
card 
Swiss Postal Service Public May 2010 270,000 
Mobile ID Based on SIM 
card 
Swisscom (now a 
joint venture with 
other telco 
companies) 
Private October 2013 2 million 
SwissPass Based on 
RFID card 
Swiss Federal 
Railways 
Public August 2015 3.8 million 
SwissID Virtual SwissSign Group AG 
(a joint venture 
between large 
private and public 
companies) 
Public-
private-
partnership 
May 2017 500,000 
Note: At the end of 2018, Switzerland had a population of 8,542,300 (Swiss Federal Office of Statistics 2019) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Current shareholder companies of SwissSign Group AG 
 
